This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 August 2025.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

( 1 ) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21 , ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj .

( 2 ) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China ( OJ C, C/2024/7459, 19.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7459/oj ).

( 3 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/511 of 20 March 2025 making imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration ( OJ L, 2025/511, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/511/oj ).

( 4 ) AD726 Candles_Note to the file_Provisional sample_EU producers of 19/12/2024; t24.011572

AD726 Note for the file - definitive sample of EU producers of 17/01/2025; 25.001025.

( 5 ) AD726 Note for the file - Change definitive sample of EU producer of 24/02/2025; t25.002394.

( 6 ) TRON t25.000237 of 6 January 2025.

( 7 ) TRON t25.000574 of 10 January 2025.

( 8 ) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2771 .

( 9 ) Company 1 and Company 5 are part of the complainant, who submitted the request under the condition that each producer be granted anonymous treatment, citing a genuine risk of commercial retaliation from their Union customers, who are also customers of the Chinese exporting producers. The Commission considered the request for anonymity to be duly warranted and granted it accordingly.

( 10 ) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024, SWD(2024) 91 final, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2024)91&lang=en .

( 11 ) Such as the 14th FYP for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035 (‘14th FYP’), available at: t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN (accessed on 3 June 2025).

( 12 ) Xinhua News Agency, ‘SASAC: The State-owned economy should maintain absolute control over seven industries’, available at: https://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-12/18/content_472256.htm (accessed on 6 June 2025).

( 13 ) Usha C. V. Haley and George T. Haley, ‘Through the Looking Glass: Subsidies to China’s Glass Industry’ in Subsidies to Chinese Industry: State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy , (OUP, 23 May 2013), available at: https://academic.oup.com/book/11363/chapter/160011767 (accessed on 3 June 2025).

( 14 ) List of China’s WTO notifications, available at: https://notifications.wto.org/en/status-by-member/china (accessed on 3 June 2025).

( 15 ) Report – Chapter 2, p. 8.

( 16 ) Report – Chapter 2, p. 7.

( 17 ) See at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm (accessed on 3 June 2025).

( 18 ) Report – Chapter 2, p. 20-21.

( 19 ) Report – Chapter 2, p. 20.

( 20 ) Report – Chapter 4, p. 75.

( 21 ) Report – Chapter 4. p. 99.

( 22 ) Report – Chapter 18, p. 538.

( 23 ) Report – Chapter 8, p. 242.

( 24 ) Report – Chapter 12, p. 328.

( 25 ) See at: http://www.kwungs.com/ (accessed on 26 May 2025).

( 26 ) See at: http://www.kwungshome.com/ (accessed on 26 May 2025).

( 27 ) See at: https://www.chinakingking.com/ (accessed on 26 May 2025).

( 28 ) See at: https://m.chinabgao.com/top/brand/88643.html#:~:text=%E8%BF%99%E4%BA%9B%E5%93%81%E7%89%8C%E5%9C%A8%E7%9F%B3%E8%9C%A1%E7%9A%84,%E6%B4%8B%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95%E3%80%81%E7%9B%9B%E4%BA%9ASASIA%E3%80%82 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 29 ) See at: https://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/index.shtml (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 30 ) See at: http://www.sinopec.com/listco/en/ (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 31 ) See at: http://www.syhg.chemchina.com/ (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 32 ) See at: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588045/n27271785/n27271792/c14159097/content.html (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 33 ) See at: https://www.chinalco.com.cn/xwzx/ (accessed on 4 June 2025).

( 34 ) Art. 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law or General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era (see below for full reference).

( 35 ) See Art. 5 of the Law on Promoting the Private Sector, available at: https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202504/content_7022018.htm (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 36 ) See Art. 3 of the CPCIF Articles of Association, available at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 37 ) Ibid.

( 38 ) See Art. 36 of the CPCIF Articles of Association, available at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 39 ) See at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/list/40288043661dc14701661ddbe0980010 (accessed on 12 May 2025).

( 40 ) See at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/sy (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 41 ) See Art.2 of the CHCIA Articles of Association, available at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/fh (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 42 ) See Art. 3 of the CHCIA Articles of Association, available at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/xhzc (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 43 ) See Art.36 of the CHCIA Articles of Association, available at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/xhzc (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 44 ) See at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/lsh (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 45 ) See at: https://www.cnfa.net.cn/index.aspx (accessed on 4 June 2025).

( 46 ) See at: https://www.cnfa.net.cn/about/1546.aspx (accessed on 4 June 2025).

( 47 ) Ibid.

( 48 ) See at: http://www.cnagi.org.cn/djgz (accessed on 4 June 2025).

( 49 ) See at: http://www.cnagi.org.cn/newsinfo/8098191.html (accessed on 4 June 2025).

( 50 ) Ibid.

( 51 ) Report – Chapter 5, p. 100-104.

( 52 ) Report – Chapter 5, p. 126.

( 53 ) See for example: Blanchette, J. – Xi’s Gamble: The Race to Consolidate Power and Stave off Disaster ; Foreign Affairs, vol. 100, no. 4, July/August 2021, pp. 10-19.

( 54 ) Report – Chapter 2, p. 19-26.

( 55 ) See at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 56 ) General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era, available at: www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 57 ) Financial Times (2020) - Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 58 ) See at: https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%B1%9F%E6%98%8E%E5%AD%98/62615366#reference-1 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 59 ) See at: https://www.chinakingking.com/party_building/detail/1.html (accessed on 27 May 2025.).

( 60 ) See at: http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/000/000/041/41878.shtml (accessed on 27 May 2025).

( 61 ) See at: https://www.chinalco.com.cn/dqjs/dqjs_djdt/202404/t20240422_126423.html (accessed on 5 June 2025).

( 62 ) Report – Chapters 6, pp. 134-138.

( 63 ) Report – Chapter 8, p. 243.

( 64 ) See Art.16 of the Law on Promoting the Private Sector.

( 65 ) 14th FYP on raw materials, available at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 66 ) Ibid.

( 67 ) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 68 ) https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202308/content_6900274.htm (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 69 ) See at: https://www.ln.gov.cn/web/qmzx/lnsqmzxxtpsnxd/lnzxd/bm/2024061709101833774/index.shtml (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 70 ) Ibid.

( 71 ) See at: https://www.sohu.com/a/494828794_433256 (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 72 ) See at: https://www.ningjin.gov.cn/xxgk/content/26103.html (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 73 ) Report – Chapter 14, p. 315.

( 74 ) Report – Chapter 8, p. 242.

( 75 ) Report – Chapter 9, p. 260.

( 76 ) Report – Chapter 9, p. 262.

( 77 ) Report – Chapter 13, p. 361.

( 78 ) Report – Chapter 13, p. 332.

( 79 ) Report – Chapter 13, p. 370-373.

( 80 ) Report – Chapter 5, p. 107.

( 81 ) Report – Chapter 5, p. 126.

( 82 ) Report – Chapter 6, p. 149.

( 83 ) Report – Chapter 10, p. 272.

( 84 ) See official policy document of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission of 28 August 2020: Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022 ), available at: http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (accessed on 28 May 2025). The Plan instructs to ‘further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector’. Moreover, the Plan’s section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: ‘we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management.’

( 85 ) See CBIRC’s Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method, issued on 15 December 2020: http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 86 ) See IMF Working Paper ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, by Wojciech Maliszewski, Serkan Arslanalp, John Caparusso, José Garrido, Si Guo, Joong Shik Kang, W. Raphael Lam, T. Daniel Law, Wei Liao, Nadia Rendak, Philippe Wingender, Jiangyan Yu, Longmei Zhang, October 2016, WP/16/203.

( 87 ) Report – Chapter 10, p. 272.

( 88 ) OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris. p. 29, available at:

https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chn-2019-en (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 89 ) http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-04/20/content_5504241.htm (accessed on 28 May 2025).

( 90 ) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income .

( 91 ) https://connect.spglobal.com/

( 92 ) https://www.macmap.org/

( 93 ) ( https://app.bot.or.th/BTWS_STAT/statistics/BOTWEBSTAT.aspx?reportID=636&language=ENG )

( 94 ) https://www.mea.or.th/en/our-services/mea-service/e-service/electric-monthly-calculate/type4 .

( 95 ) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries ( OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33 , ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj ). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

( 96 ) ( https://app.bot.or.th/BTWS_STAT/statistics/BOTWEBSTAT.aspx?reportID=636&language=ENG )

( 97 ) https://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=utility_costs and https://www.mea.or.th/en/our-services/tariff-calculation/latestft .

( 98 ) Council Regulation (EC) No 393/2009 of 11 May 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China ( OJ L 119, 14.5.2009, p. 1 , ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/393/oj ).

( 99 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1361 of 6 August 2015 repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of certain candles, tapers and the like originating in the People's Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 ( OJ L 210, 7.8.2015, p. 3 , ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2015/1361/oj ).

( 100 ) Chinese exports to the rest of the world are substantial in volume and at prices lower than those to the Union (source: Global Trade Atlas).

( 101 ) The Commission also searched for an international benchmark, but no such benchmark was readily available. Furthermore, the Commission observed that world prices are influenced by imports from China and its pricing. As the major exporter of paraffin wax, China impacts the import prices of the rest of the world. In addition, in all other potential representative countries analysed, the share of Chinese imports and their impact on the average price was significant. The only exception, in addition to Türkiye, was the Philippines which had 33 % share of imports from China. The price of the non-Chinese imports was even higher than in Türkiye, that is 18 CNY/kg.

( 102 ) https://uniway-sourcing.com/china/candle-manufacturers-suppliers-in-china/

( 103 ) https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/candles .

( 104 ) This is supported by evidence comparing the prices paid by the Complainant for paraffin imported from China (Annex 5.8 of the Complaint) with the prevailing market prices within China (Annex 5.7 of the Complaint), which clearly show a disparity in favour of Chinese producers.

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2025/1732 of 13 August 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China ANNEX