This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .

It shall apply as of 1 July 2022.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 23 June 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

( 1 ) OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p. 16 .

( 2 ) OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33 .

( 3 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products, ( OJ L 31, 1.2.2019, p. 27 ).

( 4 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 of 24 June 2021 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 to prolong the safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products ( OJ L 225 I, 25.6.2021, p. 1 ).

( 5 ) Notice of Initiation concerning a review of the safeguard measure applicable to imports of certain steel products (2021/C 509/10) ( OJ C 509, 17.12.2021, p. 12 ).

( 6 ) Council Regulation (EU) 2022/428 of 15 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine ( OJ L 87 I, 15.3.2022, p. 13 ).

( 7 ) For Belarus all steel products were subject to the import ban (i.e. all those subject to the safeguard measure were thus included), while for Russia the ban applied only to those steel products subject to the steel safeguard measure.

( 8 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/434 of 15 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure against imports of certain steel products ( OJ L 88, 16.3.2022, p. 181 ).

( 9 ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/664 of 21 April 2022 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure against imports of certain steel products ( OJ L 121, 22.4.2022, p. 12 ).

( 10 ) Regulation (EU) 2022/870 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on temporary trade-liberalisation measures supplementing trade concessions applicable to Ukrainian products under the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part ( OJ L 152, 3.6.2022, p. 103 ).

( 11 ) For this reason, even if in certain categories Ukraine appears listed in the Annex, those country-specific quotas having an order number linked to them are not applicable.

( 12 ) Including the subsequent increases on account of liberalisation.

( 13 ) See recital (33) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/894 of 29 June 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products ( OJ L 206, 30.6.2020, p. 27 ): “Lastly, the Commission also notes that the reference period used to calculate the TRQs constitutes one of the pillars in the design of the measures set ab initio by the definitive Regulation, and that the scope of the Review does not cover the substantial modification of the basic structure of the measures”.

( 14 ) Ibid at Section 3.2.1.

( 15 ) Category 7 is also affected by the import ban on a historically important supplier: Russia.

( 16 ) Source: Tariff Quota Consultation, accessible at:

https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp

( 17 ) Quotas corresponding to Ukraine are not part of the safeguard measure, and hence, not available to any other country as long as the temporary suspension referred to in recital (9) remains in place.

( 18 ) See Section 3.2.3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/894.

( 19 ) Source: Eurostat.

( 20 ) This will not apply as long as the safeguard measure is suspended vis-a-vis Ukraine.

( 21 ) Article 7.4 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.

( 22 ) Article 19(4) of Regulation (EU) 2015/478.

( 23 ) The level of TRQ allocated to the EU is around 3.3 million tonnes per year, which amounts to around 2.5% of Union industry’s average volume of domestic sales in the Union market (years 2018-2019).

( 24 ) Both the Definitive and the Prolongation Regulations showed that in overall terms the Union industry had certain additional capacity available.

( 25 ) Several interested parties argued that the US tends to have generally the highest level of prices.

( 26 ) US Report on TRQ consumption.

( 27 ) In 2021, the import share of Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia and Argentina in the Union market was 0.9%.

( 28 ) The combined share of imports into the Union from Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia and Argentina in the period 2013-2021 was 2.25% of total imports (and reaching a peak of only 3.7% in 2016).

( 29 ) In past functioning reviews it was shown that certain countries were able to substantially and rapidly increase their presence in the Union market, e.g. with very quick exhaustions of quotas, including additional quotas in Q4.

( 30 ) It is relevant to point out that the largest exporting countries to the Union have consistently claimed (including in the submissions of this review) that the existing quotas would be severely constraining their ability to export to the Union, thus suggesting that they would be able to increase their presence in the Union market in the absence of a safeguard measure.

( 31 ) See Section 3.1.2.g of Prolongation Regulation for a more detailed assessment. In terms of volumes, the Union market continues to be the main steel importing market worldwide. See OECD’s Steel Market Developments – Q2 2022 , (DSTI/SC(2022)1), table 8.

( 32 ) See, for instance, the Commission’s findings in Section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of the Prolongation Regulation.

( 33 ) See, for instance, the Chair’s Statement at the 91st Session of the OECD Steel Committee (29-31 March 2022): “excess capacity, which stood at 544 million tonnes in 2021 and has remained at persistently elevated levels since 2018, highlighting the need for further capacity reductions in the relevant jurisdictions”. Accessible at: 91st Session of the OECD Steel Committee - Chair's Statement - OECD;

See also OECD’s Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity, p.4 and 6 (DSTI/SC(2022)3: “Global excess capacity in steel continues to grow. Global crude steelmaking capacity increased by 6.0 million metric tonnes (mmt), or 0.2%, to 2 454,3 mmt in 2021”;

See also G7’s Trade Ministers’ Joint Communiqué of 21 October 2021: “We reaffirmed the importance of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC) as a forum that can help address the issue of global steel excess capacity in a multilateral framework. We will continue to support and work with the OECD to build on their excellent work undertaken to date, including a continued focus on the analysis of the incidence and magnitude of market-distorting practices and the impacts these may have on issues such as creating and maintaining overcapacity”; available at: https://www.g7uk.org/g7-trade-ministers-communique-2/

( 34 ) Imports into the US in 2021 were in overall terms 21% lower than in the year 2017, i.e. pre-US Section 232 measure.

( 35 ) Volumes of exports lost, inter alia, to US and Union markets, as well as to other third markets. For more details see Section 3.1.2 of Prolongation Regulation.

( 36 ) The reduction of imports among countries with relevant exports to the Union which are not benefitting from any preferential treatment under the US Section 232 measure, including inter alia China, India, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine and the UK was of -48% as opposed to an overall reduction in imports of -21% (see footnote 34). Source: United States International Trade Commission - https://dataweb.usitc.gov

( 37 ) Taking Hot-Rolled Flat price in the Union as a reference (comparing the peak reached in mid-March with data in mid-May 2022).

( 38 ) Source: S&P Platts Global and Steel Business Briefing (SBB) (available upon subscription).

For evidence from publicly available sources on the evolution of prices in the Union, see, inter alia: MEPS International - https://mepsinternational.com/gb/en/news/buying-panic-subsides-in-european-steel-market (20 April 2022); EUROMETAL -Lower import offers, poor demand drags down EU HRC prices - EUROMETAL (2 May 2022); Metal Bulletin - https://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/5097739/HRC-prices-across-Europe-continue-to-slide- on-weak-demand.html (10 May 2022) and https://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/5098015/hot-rolled-coil/European-HRC-buyers-continue-to-be-held-back-by-sufficient-stocks-weak-demand.html (12 May 2022)

( 39 ) See WorldSteel Association, Short Range Outlook, April 2022, available at: worldsteel Short Range Outlook April 2022 - worldsteel.org

( 40 ) See OECD’s Economic and Social Impacts and Policy Implications of the War in Ukraine, 29 March 2022, pages 7 and 8, available at: https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/Item_3.1_Economic_and_financial_market_Impacts.pdf

See also 91st Session of the OECD Steel Committee - Chair's Statement, available at: https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/91-oecd-steel-chair-statement.htm; “Increased stress on global supply chains, including semiconductor chip shortages, rising energy costs and the prospects for higher interest rates due to accelerating inflation were dampening industrial activity and global demand for steel. (…) The impacts are being felt directly as a significant negative supply shock on steel and raw materials from Russia and Ukraine, affecting the European steel industry in particular, leading to surging steel and raw material prices. The global steel industry is also suffering from indirect impacts such as higher energy and production costs as well as a slowdown in global economic growth that will dampen steel demand considerably going forward.”

( 41 ) See World Bank’s Commodity Prices, May 2022, at: CMO-Pink-Sheet-May-2022.pdf (worldbank.org)

( 42 ) See price evolution of steel products at S&P Platts Global, April 2022 Global Market Outlook (available upon subscription).

( 43 ) Source: Global Trade Atlas – analysis focused on the comparison (year 2021 v. 2019) of the level of export prices by some of the main steel-producing worldwide for the categories subject to the EU steel safeguard measure. The analysis showed the following evolution of export prices from some of the main steel-producing countries in the world of the product subject to the EU Safeguard measure: China (+43%), India (+32%), Japan (+14%), Russia (+28%), South Korea (+27%), Turkey (+43%), and the UK (+21%).

( 44 ) Source: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp

( 45 ) The volume of imports in 2021 was only 1.5% lower than that in 2018.

( 46 ) See World Steel Short Range Outlook, accessible at: worldsteel Short Range Outlook of 14 April 2022 - worldsteel.org

( 47 ) In this respect, Article 3.g of Regulation (EU) 2022/428 allowed to continue importing from Russia and Belarus, under the residual quota, as long as contracts concluded before 16 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, were executed by 17 June 2022.

( 48 ) In this respect, the Commission recalled that Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures ( OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p. 11 ), properly deals with the interaction of safeguard and anti-dumping and countervailing measures. See also judgment of 20 October 2021, Novolipetsk Steel PAO v. Commission , T-790/19, ECLI:EU:T:2021:706.

( 49 ) Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (‘Withdrawal Agreement’), OJ L 63, 31.1.2020, p. 7 .

( 50 ) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2037 of 10 December 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure against imports of certain steel products ( OJ L 416, 11.12.2020, p. 32 ).

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/978 of 23 June 2022 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products ANNEX I ANNEX II “ANNEX IV